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## Office of the Attorney General

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DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM JUL - 6 20059

MARY L.M. MORAN CLERK OF COURT

## IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM HAGÅTÑA, GUAM

Civil Case No. 04-00006 JULIE BABAUTA SANTOS, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,

Petitioner,

VS.

FELIX P. CAMACHO, Governor of Guam; ART ILAGAN, Director of Department of Revenue and Taxation; LOURDES M. PEREZ, Director of Department of Administration; DOUGLAS B. MOYLAN, Attorney General of Guam; and GOVERNMENT OF GUAM,

Respondents.

**CLARIFICATION OF** ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MARCH 11,

2005 **MOTION TO AMEND MARCH 2, 2005** ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF FEBRUARY 9, 2005 ORDER TO CERTIFY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Court has requested the Office of Attorney General to clarify it's March 11, 2005 filing

which asks the Court to amend its order of March 2, 2005 to certify for interlocutory appeal to the

Page 1

SANTOS v FELIX P. CAMACHO, et. al. District Court of Guam Civil Case No. 04-00036

> Case 1:04-cv-00006 Document 220 Filed 07/06/2005 Page 1 of 7

Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals questions presented by the Court's February 9, 2005 and March 2, 2005 Orders. However, a procedural problem has arisen in this case.

In the February 9, 2005 Order, this Court wrote as follows:

Finally, the Court notes that the consent to full disposition by the below-signed [Magistrate] judge was signed only by Attorney Phillips and the Attorney General. (See Docket No. 13.) This consent form was executed and filed during the time period when the Governor was off-island and the Settlement Agreement was being negotiated. The Governor has asserted that he was not involved in the negotiations and has not been fully informed of the negotiation process. Thus, the Court finds that there has been no consent by the Governor to proceed before the Magistrate Judge. The motion for adoption of the administrative plan will therefore proceed on February 28, 2005, before the visiting District Judge.

(Emphasis added.) The docket entry for February 9, 2005 [NR. 149-1], states the same: That because the Governor had not consented to proceed before the Magistrate Judge, the "motion for adoption of the administrative plan will therefore proceed on 2/28/05, before the visiting District Judge." It is unclear from the face of the February 9, 2005 Order that any other aspect of this case other than the motion for adoption of the administrative plan was to proceed before the District Judge. Nor did the March 2, 2005 Order denying the Attorney General's Motion for Reconsideration state that all pending matters were henceforth to decided by the District Judge, nor did either order advise the parties that all matters subsequent to the February 9, 2005 Order should be considered to be governed by the rules and General Order No. 04-00016 pertaining to the authority of the Magistrate Judge to perform judicial functions.

<sup>1</sup> See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). Had the case proceeded by consent of the parties, a direct appeal would lie to the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. That is why the Attorney General sought in the first instance to ask the Magistrate Judge to amend its March 2, 2005 order in order to certify the issues presented for interlocutory appeal by permission.

It is respectfully submitted that the issue of who is properly authorized under the Organic Act to represent the defendants in this action is a "case-dispositive" matter. This is so because the question of who is properly authorized to represent the Government of Guam and the named defendants goes to the very heart of the issue of who is properly before the Court. General Order No. 04-00016 expressly provides that the Magistrate Judge is authorized to [h]ear and determine any pretrial motions, including discovery motions, other than case-dispositive motions." General Order No. 04-00016 also provides for the referral of specific motions to the Magistrate Judge who shall "submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition by the District Judge." Thus, it may very well have been that upon the appearance of independent counsel on behalf of the Governor, the Department of Administration, and Department of Revenue and Taxation, the questions that were decided by the Magistrate Judge in its February 9, 2005 Order should either have been heard in the first instance by the District Judge, or by Order of Referral to the Magistrate Judge for findings and recommendation. Nevertheless, the issues were tried by consent before the Magistrate Judge.

Since the entry of the February 9, 2005 Order, the Docket Sheet reflects two express orders of referral of any pending matters from the District Judge to the Magistrate Judge as is provided by General Order No. 04-00016. By Order dated February 21, 2005 [NR. 150], the District Judge referred Petitioner's Motion for Orders Approving Administration Plan, and by Order February 22, 2005 [NR 158], the District Judge referred the Governor's Motion to Vacate the Stipulated Order of

June 17, 2004 Preliminarily Approving Settlement to the Magistrate Judge for findings and recommendation.

On March 10, 2005, District Judge Ronald S.W. Lew signed a "Request and Order" which was filed with the Court on March 11, 2005 [NR. 182]. The Request and Order was submitted by all counsel and reads:

The parties respectfully requests [sic] that all present and future motions in this case be referred hereinafter for initial disposition to the United States Magistrate Judge of the District Court of Guam, subject to the review of a District Court Judge as provided by law. Most motions thus far have been referred to the Magistrate on a piecemeal basis at least one of the two similar tax refund cases brought by individuals who initially attempted to intervene in this case also have been referred to the Magistrate in some part. As a result, the Magistrate is abundantly familiar with all of the facts, local tax laws, and issues herein. However this request is not intended to constitute consent by all parties to a magistrate as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and/or Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.

Petitioner and the Attorney General have previously consented to the Magistrate; however, the Court found in its February 9, 2005 Order that "there has been no consent by the Governor to proceed before the Magistrate Judge." (Order at 10.)

Presumably, therefore, the Court's March 2, 2005 Order denying reconsideration should have been styled as a proposed order, or finding and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (C) ("the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties"). Except that as of March 2, 2005, all parties were proceeding as though they had consented to the Magistrate Judge continuing to exercise full jurisdiction of all matters. And, of course, to add to the confusion, if that is the case, the Attorney General's February 17, 2005 "Motion to Reconsider Court's Order of February 9, 2005" should have been construed *post hoc* as an objection to the "findings and recommendations" of the Magistrate Judge dated February 9, 2005.

Nevertheless, whether by mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, and even in the face of the Court's recognition in its February 9, 2005 Order that the Governor had not consented, it appears that all parties, and perhaps the Court, had continued to treat the issues presented by the Court's February 9, 2005 Order and March 2, 2005 Order denying reconsideration as matters properly consented to be presented to the Magistrate Judge for decision. Indeed, it can easily be inferred by the conduct of the parties that the issues presented relating to who is properly authorized to represent the Government of Guam and the named defendants were originally tried before the Magistrate Judge by implied consent, and without objection from the Governor or the Department of Revenue and Taxation and Department of Administration. Stated another way, although the Governor was entitled to appear and object to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, it appears the confusion was caused by the parties impliedly continuing to proceed by consent before the Magistrate Judge, in particular with respect to the issues presented by the February 9, 2005 and March 2, 2005 Orders. *Cf. Roell v. Withrow*, 538 U.S. 580 (2003) (consent to proceedings before Magistrate Judge can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation).

Now, in light of the Attorney General's March 11, 2005 Motion to Amend the March 2, 2005 Order Denying Reconsideration of its February 9, 2005 Order, and to Certify Interlocutory Appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court has *sua sponte* raised the issue of whether this motion is properly before the Magistrate Judge, or if so, what relief the Attorney General is seeking. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge has inquired of the Attorney General whether by asking the Court to amend its March 2, 2005 Order (entered at a time when all parties at least impliedly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge), he is (1) seeking an appeal to the District Judge of the March 2, 2005 denial of the motion for reconsideration; or (2)

asking the Magistrate Judge to issue a report and recommendation to the District Judge recommending the certification of an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

Given the procedural complexities and the parties' confusion, the Attorney General respectfully suggests that the Attorney General's March 11, 2005 filing be construed as an objection to the Magistrate Judge's March 2, 2005 Order denying reconsideration, with the additional request that the Magistrate Judge amend its March 2, 2005 Order to reflect (a) that it is a proposed order, findings and recommendation; and (b) that the proposed order of the Magistrate Judge include the recommendation that regardless of how the District Judge rules on the objection, that the issues be certified for interlocutory review as presented in the Attorney General's March 11, 2005 filing.

Respectfully submitted, this 6<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2005.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL **Douglas B. Moylan, Attorney General** 

Robert M. Weinberg

Assistant Attorney General

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2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3	This is to certify that I have this day served counsel for the opposing party(ies) with a
4	copy of the foregoing by hand delivery, or by first class properly addressed, to:
5	Michael Phillips, Esq.
6	Phillips & Bordallo, P.C. 410 West O'Brien Dr.
7	Hagåtña, Guam 96910  Rawlen MT Mantanona, Esq.  Mantanona Law Office GCIC Bldg., Suite 601B 414 West Soledad Ave.  Hagåtña, Guam 96910
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11	Rodney J. Jacob, Esq. Daniel Benjamin, Esq. Calvo and Clark, LLP 655 South Marine Drive, Suite 202 Tamuning, Guam 96913
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13	
14	Shannon J. Taitano, Esq.
15	Legal Counsel Office of the Governor of Guam
16	P.O. Box 2950 Hagåtña, Guam 96932
17	
18	this 6th day of July, 2005.
19	Alyen
20	Robert M. Weinberg Assistant Attorney General
21	Assistant Attorney General
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